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Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors |
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Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
(1)
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA
Vienna, 6 January 2003 |
 I
have requested this meeting of the Board to consider recent events relevant to
the compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its
safeguards agreement pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).
As you are
fully aware, the DPRK has been in chronic non-compliance with its safeguards
agreement since 1993 when the Agency was unable to verify that the DPRK had
declared to the Agency all nuclear material, specifically plutonium, that is
subject to safeguards. And since 1994 the DPRK has sought shelter behind the US-DPRK
“Agreed Framework” — a bilateral framework that does not replace or modify
DPRK’s obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement — claiming a legally
untenable “unique status” under the NPT whereby its safeguards agreement is
“suspended”, thus circumventing compliance with its non-proliferation
obligations.
This
claim by the DPRK has been rejected by the Board of Governors and the General
Conference, which unequivocally declared the safeguards agreement to be binding
and in force.
 The
latest events further aggravate the situation.
Not only
did the DPRK fail to respond to the repeated requests of the Secretariat and the
Board for clarification of recent reports concerning an alleged undeclared
enrichment programme, but in the last few weeks has shown complete defiance
towards its obligations under the safeguards agreement by cutting all seals and
impeding the functioning of all surveillance cameras that were in place in its
nuclear facilities. These unilateral actions culminated in a request for the
immediate departure of Agency inspectors at a time when the DPRK is in the
process of restarting its nuclear facilities and when the presence of inspectors
is critical.
All
these unilateral acts by the DPRK have taken place against a backdrop of
repeated requests by the Secretariat to the Government of the DPRK to work with
the Agency to maintain continuity of safeguards by ensuring an orderly
transition from a situation where activities in the facilities were frozen to
one in which the facilities became operational.
And while
the Secretariat took note of the decision to restart the operation of the
facilities, it also made it clear that this should only take place in full
compliance with the DPRK’s non-proliferation obligations to ensure that the
facilities, and the nuclear material contained therein, are dedicated
exclusively to peaceful purposes. As you can see from my report, the Agency is
regrettably at present unable to exercise its responsibilities under the
safeguards agreement, namely to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear
material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and is also at
present unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the
nuclear material that is subject to safeguards.
This
is clearly an unsustainable situation and sets a dangerous precedent, namely
that non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations can be tolerated.
If we aim
to maintain and preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime then it
must be incumbent on all parties to that regime to fully meet their respective
obligations, and all cases of non-compliance must be consistently addressed in a
uniform fashion — namely zero tolerance.
 In
my view, the next few weeks and months will be important to the future of the
non-proliferation regime.
We can
succeed only if all the parties to the regime understand that the settlement of
disputes cannot be linked to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons or other
forms of nuclear brinkmanship. I do hope that the DPRK will understand that it
is compliance rather than defiance that will open the way to a dialogue to
address its security and other concerns. Only through dialogue can differences
be resolved or reconciled. In this connection, I am encouraged by the expressed
readiness of all concerned parties to enter into such a dialogue once the DPRK
has reversed course. I am also encouraged by the readiness of the Board, as
reflected in the draft resolution submitted by its chairman, to afford the DPRK
another opportunity to come into compliance. I hope that the DPRK will seize
this opportunity and thus create the conditions for an agreed resolution of all
outstanding issues. But the draft resolution also makes it clear that any lack
of co-operation to implement all the required safeguards measures will
constitute further non-compliance, with all the consequences foreseen under the
Statute.
Over
the last four decades, the international community has been painstakingly
building a universal regime that aims to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and
simultaneously move towards nuclear disarmament.
The regime
has been, regrettably, subject to setbacks in the recent past. Ultimately, the
choice is ours: either a determined effort to consolidate the regime and
maintain its integrity or risk a world where a growing number of States acquire
and depend on nuclear weapons. I trust that we will make the right choice.
1) Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), an intergovernmental organization within the United Nations
system.
Revista INTER-FORUM is affiliated with
(ICCAP) Any reproduction in part or whole is strictly forbidden without the authors written authorization
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January 08, 2003
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